Complete elimination of information leakage in continuous-variable
  quantum communication channels by Jacobsen, Christian S. et al.
Complete elimination of information leakage in continuous-variable quantum
communication channels
Christian S. Jacobsen,1, ∗ Lars S. Madsen,1 Vladyslav C. Usenko,2 Radim Filip,2 and Ulrik L. Andersen1
1Center for Macroscopic Quantum States (bigQ), Department of Physics,
Technical University of Denmark, Fysikvej, 2800 Kongens Lyngby, Denmark
2Department of Optics, Palacky University, 17. listopadu 12, 771 46 Olomouc, Czech Republic
(Dated: September 28, 2018)
In all lossy communication channels realized to date, information is inevitably leaked to a potential
eavesdropper. Here we present a communication protocol that does not allow for any information
leakage to a potential eavesdropper in a purely lossy channel. By encoding information into a
restricted Gaussian alphabet of squeezed states we show, both theoretically and experimentally,
that the Holevo information between the eavesdropper and the intended recipient can be exactly
zero in a purely lossy channel while minimized in a noisy channel. This result is of fundamental
interest, but might also have practical implications in extending the distance of secure quantum key
distribution.
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2INTRODUCTION
Security in communication is of utmost importance in modern society. It allows for the delivery of information
to the intended recipients while preventing unauthorized eavesdroppers from accessing it. Conceptually, it can be
treated as a tripartite communication network in which two entities (e.g. Alice and Bob) intend to communicate
while a third party - the eavesdropper (known as Eve) - tries to intercept the message. See Fig. 1, where the
mutual information between the three parties is represented schematically. If successful, the interception will generate
correlations between all three parties, as in Fig. 1(a), possibly rendering the communication scheme insecure. To
regain security, the correlations between the intended recipient and the interceptor must be suppressed. This can be
done by means of data post-processing such as privacy amplification - a method commonly used to establish security in
quantum key distribution (QKD) schemes [1, 2]. However, privacy amplification is only successful if the information
IAB between the trusted parties Alice and Bob is larger than the information between Bob and Eve prior to the
implementation of the procedure [3].
IAB
IAE IBE
E
A B
a b
I'AB
I'AE
E
A B
FIG. 1. A tripartite communication scenario between Alice (A), Eve (E) and Bob (B). a) Each party shares some amount of
mutual information, given in terms of Shannon entropies as IXY = H(X) +H(Y ) −H(X,Y ), with the other two parties. b)
In the context of message security, it is the goal of the honest parties, Alice and Bob, to completely eliminate the information
that they share with Eve. By removing all correlations between Eve and Bob (that is I ′BE = 0), the adversary obtains no
information about what Bob has measured, and thus secret communication between A and B can be established.
As an alternative to data postprocessing, the information gained by an eavesdropper can be suppressed by using an
entanglement-based protocol followed by entanglement distillation or purification [4]. Here the two communicating
parties seek to share entangled states but due to the interception, the system ends up in a three-party entangled
state, subsequently reduced to a purified two-party entangled state between Alice and Bob, thereby eliminating the
correlations with the eavesdropper. This strategy is however very challenging as it requires multi-copy non-Gaussian
transformations in conventional communication schemes based on Gaussian states encoding and homodyne/heterodyne
detection [5–7].
In this Letter we present a completely different approach for minimizing information leakage which is not based on
conventional a posteriori error correction or privacy amplification and therefore does not rely on any prior information
advantage. Instead of suppressing the information of Eve by privacy amplification or distillation at Bob’s station, we
propose the opposite approach of designing the Gaussian input states and alphabet at Alice’s station in such a way
that Eve cannot gain any information at any time in a purely lossy channel, as in Fig. 1(b). We show that by encoding
the information into squeezed states of a restricted Gaussian alphabet it is possible to completely and deterministically
eliminate the presence of an eavesdropper, corresponding to the realization of a channel with a Holevo information
of zero. The protocol is based on continuous variables (CV) in which quadratures are modulated and measured with
homodyne detectors [4, 8, 9] which is contrasted with discrete variables communication where photon counters are
used. We note that no analogue of our proposed scheme for the complete elimination of the Holevo information is
known for discrete variables. Unlike covert communication [10, 11] where the transmission of information is hidden
from the eavesdropper, the presence of the signal states are still detectable by Eve in the proposed scheme. In contrast
to the private states known from discrete variables [12, 13], which still rely on distillation procedures, our method
allows for direct elimination of the information accessible by an eavesdropper using proper state preparation and
ideally needs no distillation.
RESULTS
We consider the elimination of information leakage in the context of QKD. In CVQKD protocols with reverse
reconciliation [14–22] the lower bound on the rate of secret key generation in the asymptotic limit of an infinitely long
3key is given by
R = βIAB − χEB , (1)
where IAB is the mutual information between Alice and Bob as defined through the Shannon entropy [3, 23], β ∈]0; 1]
is the post-processing efficiency, and χEB is the Holevo information which is an upper bound on the information IEB
acquired by Eve [24]. A secret key can therefore only be generated when βIAB > χEB . In all previously proposed
protocols, the Holevo information has been non-zero (even in principle), which in turn has put stringent conditions onto
the processed mutual information between Alice and Bob, βIAB . This condition has been experimentally fulfilled by
applying state-of-the-art postprocessing protocols [25] with high efficiency and low-noise homodyne detectors [8, 26–
31]. These stringent conditions on Bob’s measurements and data processing to enable security can however be largely
relaxed by reducing the Holevo information that upper-bounds the information leakage.
Minimization of information leakage
We consider a prepare-and-measure CVQKD protocol where information is encoded solely into a single quadrature
(here the amplitude quadrature X with a variance Vsig) of a Gaussian squeezed state of amplitude quadrature variance
Vsqz (see Fig. 2(a)), and investigate theoretically under which condition it is possible to completely decouple a potential
eavesdropper from the channel.
The maximal information, that is the capacity, between Eve and Bob is given by the Holevo quantity:
χEB = S(E)− S(E|B) , (2)
where S(E) is the von Neumann entropy of the state received by Eve and S(E|B) is the von Neuman entropy of the
state at Eve conditioned on the measurement at Bob. In the case of a noisy quantum channel, the general collective
attack can be accessed by assuming that Eve holds the purification of the state shared between Alice and Bob [32, 33].
Using the triangle inequality, one can derive the self-duality property of the von Neumann entropy, which states
that S(E) = S(AB) and S(E|B) = S(A|B) [34]. From (2), it is clear that a Holevo information of zero requires
S(E) = S(E|B), and from the purification this translates into S(AB) = S(A|B). This condition is evaluated in the
following by individually deducing S(AB) and S(A|B).
For a Gaussian protocol, where Gaussian attacks are optimal in the asymptotic limit [32, 35], the von Neumann
entropies may be easily calculated from the symplectic spectrum of the covariance matrices of the corresponding
states [8]. To enable an explicit protocol description, we switch to the equivalent EPR based protocol [36] where an
asymmetric two-mode squeezed state is shared between Alice and Bob as shown in Fig. 2(b) [37–39].
The variance of a symmetric two mode squeezed vacuum state is denoted µ while the single mode squeezing
transformation is represented by the squeezing parameter r such that amplitude and phase quadrature variances of
the modes sent to Bob are µe−2r and µe2r, respectively. The shared state is represented by a covariance matrix,
which we may generally write as,
γAB =
[
γA σAB
σAB γB
]
, (3)
where γA = diag[µ, µ] is the covariance matrix of the EPR mode kept by Alice, γB = diag[T (e−2rµ+)+1−T, T (µe2r+
V+)+1−T ] is the covariance matrix of the mode received by Bob, and σAB = diag
[√
Te−2r(µ2 − 1),−√T (µ2 − 1)e2r]
is the sub-block of the global covariance matrix describing the correlation between modes. Here T is the transmittance,
V is the variance of the excess noise of the anti-squeezed quadrature while  represents the quadrature symmetric
excess noise contribution of the channel. γAB is constructed such that the prepare-and-measure scheme, in Fig. 2(a),
and the EPR scheme, in Fig. 2(b), are equivalent if µ =
√
1 + Vsig/Vsqz and r = −1/2 ln[
√
Vsqz(Vsqz + Vsig)] [36].
By equivalence we mean that the mutual information shared between Alice and Bob is the same in the two schemes
and that the signal mode through the quantum channel looks the same to an outside observer such as Eve in both
schemes.
The symplectic eigenvalues of (3) [40], denoted νAB,+ and νAB,−, can now be used to find the entropy S(AB)
via the relation S(AB) = g(νAB,+) + g(νAB,−) where g is the bosonic information function, g(x) = x+12 log2
(
x+1
2
)−
x−1
2 log2
(
x−1
2
)
[41]. Likewise we find the conditional entropy S(A|B) from the symplectic eigenvalue, νA|B , of the con-
ditional covariance matrix γA|B = γA−γ−1B,11σABΠσAB , where Π = diag[1, 0] assuming an X-quadrature measurement
at Bob, and γB,11 is the first diagonal element of γB . It follows then that S(A|B) = g(νA|B).
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FIG. 2. Equivalent protocol schemes. (a) Prepare-and-measure scheme for a quantum communication protocol with zero
information leakage. An ensemble of amplitude quadrature displaced coherent states is squeezed to have an overall amplitude
quadrature noise variance of vacuum before being sent into the quantum channel. (b) Equivalent entanglement-based scheme
of the quantum communication protocol with zero information leakage. An EPR state is prepared, with a local mode measured
by Alice and the outgoing mode squeezed before being sent into the quantum channel.
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FIG. 3. Numerical calculation of leakage elimination. (a) Contour plot of the Holevo information bound in terms of signal
modulation and transmittance in the quantum channel, with no excess noise and 0.5 SNU squeezing, corresponding to -3 dB.
The white line indicates the minimum information leakage. (b) Contour plot of the Holevo information bound in terms of
signal modulation and transmittance loss in the quantum channel, with excess noise  = 0.01 SNU and 0.5 SNU squeezing,
corresponding to -3 dB. The white line indicates the minimum, but non-zero, information leakage.
Finally, we arrive at the condition, g(νAB,+)+g(νAB,−) = g(νA|B), for the complete elimination of Holevo informa-
tion between Eve and Bob. For more details on this derivation, see the Supplementary Information [42]. For a purely
lossy channel without any excess noise ( = 0) this translates into the simple relation: Vsqz + Vsig = 1. This implies
that χEB can become zero while R 6= 0. It is clear that this relation cannot be realized with coherent states as in this
case Vsqz = 1 thus rendering the alphabet of zero size; Vsig = 0. Squeezed states for which Vsqz < 1 are thus required to
eliminate the Holevo quantity. To fulfill the condition, the size of the Gaussian alphabet has to be Vsig = 1−Vsqz, and
for very large squeezing degrees (Vsqz → 0) the secure information rate in (1) approaches R = βIAB = −β 12 log2(1−η).
This shows that a secret key can in principle be generated for any channel loss and for any post-processing efficiency.
It is also interesting to note that the elimination of the Holevo information is completely independent on the noise
in the anti-squeezed quadrature, that is, it is independent on the impurity of the squeezed states [43]. We further
remark that for ideal reconciliation efficiency, β = 1, the rate reaches half of the fundamental repeaterless bound for
which R = − log2(1− η) [44].
Evaluation of the Holevo quantity for the general case is found numerically and is shown in Fig. 3 for a purely lossy
channel (Fig. 3(a)) and for a channel with an untrusted excess noise of  = 0.01 shot-noise units (SNU) (Fig. 3(b)).
The minima of the Holevo information are marked by the white curves which for the purely lossy channel is exactly
zero (χEB = 0) regardless of the transmittance for Vsig = Vsqz = 0.5 SNU.
While proper state modulation can eliminate the Holevo information between Eve and Bob, it does not eliminate
the quantum mutual information between them, defined as S(E) + S(B)− S(EB). This means that the subsystems
E and B remain correlated in the quantum sense despite the fact that the information leakage is terminated. Such
quantum mutual information vanishes completely only when no squeezing and no modulation is realized by the sender,
which is shown in detail in the Supplementary Information [42]. We also note that the correlations remain non-zero
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FIG. 4. Scheme of the experimental implementation of the quantum communication protocol with zero information leakage.
An ensemble of coherent states is prepared by adding white noise to an amplitude modulator. The ensemble is squeezed by
injecting it into an OPO, which is pumped by light at λ/2. The resulting ensemble of squeezed coherent states is sent to the
quantum channel, with transmissivity T . Bob measures the channel output using homodyne detection, using an LO from the
same laser. Eve also uses homodyne detection with an LO from the same laser. AM: Amplitude Modulator, OPO: Optical
Parametric Oscillator, LO: Local oscillator, T: Transmissivity of the quantum channel.
in the conjugate quadrature, but this is irrelevant since information is only encoded in the amplitude quadrature.
Though single quadrature encoding reduces the alphabet, it does not compromise security, once basis switching and
channel estimation are performed. In an actual implementation the conjugate quadrature would have to be measured
to check the magnitude of the excess noise [37, 38].
The obtained result is based on the security analysis of Gaussian CVQKD protocols against collective attacks, which
has been shown to be valid against the most general coherent attacks in the asymptotic limit [45]. The estimation
of the lower bound on the key rate is thus performed in the asymptotic regime. In the finite-size regime the lower
bound on the key rate is further decreased by the security parameter ∆ [46], which depends on the failure probability
of the privacy amplification and speed of convergence of smooth min-entropy to von Neumann entropy [47]. For
finite data, the minimization of information leakage becomes even more important, allowing trusted parties to partly
compensate the reduction of the key rate due to finite-size effects, using proper state engineering, which does not
affect the implementation-dependent ∆ parameter directly.
Generation of states with no information leakage
We now implement a proof of principle experiment demonstrating the complete elimination of the information to an
eavesdropper in a lossy channel. A schematic of the setup is depicted in Fig. 4. The state is produced experimentally
by squeezing an asymmetric thermal state: A bright laser beam at 1064 nm is modulated using an electro-optical
modulator that is driven by a function generator. It produces white noise within the detection bandwidth, and forms
sidebands on the bright beam. These sidebands (at 4.9 MHz with a bandwidth of 90 kHz) carry the information
and correspond to an asymmetric thermal state. The modulated light beam is subsequently injected into an optical
parametric oscillator (OPO) which squeezes, in this case, the amplitude quadrature by 3 dB. For more details on
the OPO we refer to [28]. The final output state is thus an asymetric squeezed state alphabet where the amplitude
quadrature signal information is sent to a computer while the states are injected into the lossy transmittance channel.
Channel loss is simulated by a beam splitter with controllable transmittances. Eve measures the amplitude and phase
quadrature of the reflected part using a homodyne detector with an efficiency of 95 %, while Bob uses a homodyne
detector with 85 % efficiency to measure the amplitude and phase quadratures of the transmitted part. The measured
data are electronically down-converted to dc, low-pass filtered and digitized. We thus have access to the covariance
matrices of Alice, Bob and Eve as well as the amplitude quadrature correlation coefficients between Alice and Bob and
both quadrature correlation coefficients between Eve and Bob. By means of these entities, we are now in the position
to estimate the Holevo information using two different approaches: Either conservatively assuming that Eve holds the
entire purification of the state shared by Alice and Bob or, as a comparison, directly from Eve’s measurements.
Purification based estimation of Holevo information
In the first approach to finding the Holevo information, Eve is powerful and thus holds the entire purification of the
virtually entangled state shared between Alice and Bob, as is the case in a standard QKD analysis [8]. In order to
do this we need to perform the purification on Alice’s site. This is done by transforming the measured parameters at
Bob backward through the channel knowing its transmittance. This includes the amplitude quadrature correlations
between Alice and Bob, C(0)AB,X = CAB,X/
√
T , and the quadrature variances V (0)B,i = (VB,i+T − 1)/T where i = X,P .
6We are then in the position to construct the covariance matrix of the entanglement-equivalent scheme at Alice with
the modes that we name A and A′. This state is then purified according to a 4-mode purification procedure based
on the Bloch-Messiah reduction theorem [48], also known as Euler decomposition [8], similarly to what was done in
[28]. The result of this procedure is a pure state of 4-modes which we label AA
′
CD. Mode A′ is then propagated
through the channel to obtain the global state ABCD, which is then assumed to be purified by modes accessible only
to Eve. Using this global state we finally calculate the Holevo information, and plot the result for different modulation
strenghts and different transmittances as shown in Fig. 5 (blue dots).
Direct estimation of Holevo information
In the second approach we directly estimate the Holevo bound by performing homodyne detection on the mode of
light reflected from the channel, which is accesible to Eve. We use the measured data at Eve and Bob as well as the
correlation coefficients, to deduce their individual covariance matrices and the associated correlations. This allows us
to simulate Eve’s collective attack by finding the conditional von Neumann entropy S(E|B) and Eve’s von Neumann
entropy S(E). Finally, using relation (2), we directly find the Holevo information and plot the results in Fig. 5 (red
crosses) for different values for the modulation depth.
Theoretical prediction of Holevo information
In addition to the direct and purification based estimation of the Holevo information, we also plot the theoretically
expected Holevo information in terms of the signal modulation in the prepare-and-measure scheme, by numerically
evaluating Holevo information of the derived covariance matrix with the experimentally established channel parame-
ters.
Complete elimination of the Holevo information for any of the realized transmittances is clearly visible at the
previously established condition, namely for Vsig = 0.5 SNU = −3 dB given a Vsqz = 0.5 SNU = −3 dB squeezed
state such that Vsig+Vsqz = 1 SNU, regardless of the method used for the estimation. The direct estimation approach
tends to underestimate the Holevo information, while the purification based approach closely follows the theoretical
prediction of the entanglement-based scheme described previously. We provide further details on the three approaches
in the Supplementary Information [42].
It is evident from Fig. 5 that the direct estimation method underestimates the Holevo bound. This is caused
by measurement imperfections that Eve ideally would not have. On the contrary, the purification-based approach
corresponds to Eve perfectly obtaining maximum information associated with the noise level. This approach then
closely follows the theoretical prediction obtained from the entangled-based scheme.
The measured data ensemble size of the order of 105 was sufficiently large to provide good convergence of the Holevo
bound and correspondence to the theory predictions. In a practical realization of QKD, however, the key is degraded
by the finite-size effects and larger data ensemble sizes would be required to make this effect negligible. We estimate
the value of the ∆ parameter [46] in the Supplementary Information [42].
It is worth mentioning that the aim of our experiment is not to produce a secret key, but to demonstrate the complete
elimination of the Holevo information in a purely lossy channel. To produce a secret key, it is important to implement
random detection of conjugate quadratures at Bob’s station and to modulate the anti-squeezed quadrature at Alice’s
station for increased key rate or use a slightly modified analysis assuming single quadrature modulation [37, 38].
DISCUSSION
In our study we first considered purely lossy channels, in which complete elimination of information leakage can
be achieved. Noise may appear first of all as the result of imperfect detection, but in this case it can be calibrated
and assumed trusted, i.e. being out of control by Eve. Since such noise does not contribute to Eve’s information on
Bob’s measurement results [49], the complete elimination of information leakage can also be achieved upon detection
noise using the same modulation setting. In the case when untrusted noise is present in the channel, however, the
information leakage to Eve cannot be completely eliminated, but it can be effectively minimized using the same
condition on state preparation as for a lossy channel [43].
We have shown theoretically that a properly modulated squeezed state can be used to completely and deterministi-
cally decouple an eavesdropper from a purely lossy quantum channel without the use of entanglement distillation. The
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FIG. 5. Holevo information versus modulation depth for various transmittances. The modulation depth is normalized to
the variance of shot noise. The Holevo information estimation was performed using three different approaches, namely direct
estimation, general purification-based estimation, and a theoretical prediction from the channel parameters, shown with red
crosses, blue dots and a green line respectively.
scheme has been confirmed experimentally using squeezed states of light and homodyne detection. The decoupling
was shown to be completely independent on the amount of losses in the channel and the purity of the squeezed states
used in the alphabet. This result is of fundamental interest in the context of quantum security, and we believe that
the proposed protocol could offer an advantage, particularly in conjunction with a simple Gaussian error correct-
ing scheme such as [50] for the removal of non-Markovian excess noise, with channel multiplexing [51] or increased
repetition rate.
A direction of further study can be the application of our proposed scheme in CVQKD with low efficiency error
correcting codes, where an overall speedup in secret key generation may result from a partial reduction of Eve’s
information, even though the size of the alphabet is reduced. This can be useful in schemes where the error correction
step limits the key generation rate.
METHODS
We refer to the Supplementary Information [42] for additional details on the derivation of the information elimination
condition and experimental methods.
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